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Manual Security Audit
sha256 379f8edb221ee290973a9710803bd2fd86d02f7941c506d1b6a4a2ba5517acf6
The final assessment reconciled 24 canonical findings across score accounting, policy settlement, point tokenization, point trading, referrals, staking, and check-in. Fifteen findings were resolved or removed, nine remain documented trust or operating assumptions, and no implementation finding remains open.
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sha256 379f8edb221ee290973a9710803bd2fd86d02f7941c506d1b6a4a2ba5517acf6
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sha256 227cf25d20633ad4bf455457afdd5deeaab28eb0b2b3cc251db3d0a6599f2f4c
LiquidLink combines score accounting, configurable policy pipelines, tokenized points, an orderbook, referrals, staking, and check-in campaigns. The assessment treated those systems as one settlement graph: an identity or lifecycle error in one package could invalidate accounting that looked correct in isolation.
The final manual assessment records 24 canonical findings: 15 resolved or removed, nine acknowledged or conditional, and zero open. The companion formal program passed 191 of 191 shared-suite proofs and mapped every LiquidLink finding to direct proofs, protocol models, Move regressions, structural evidence, or an explicit trusted boundary.
The review centered on six invariants:
Impact. Full-width arithmetic could abort a valid exact-in fill. The implementation now uses bounded intermediates and preserves the intended rounding direction.
Impact. Residual balances could become detached from a clear accounting owner. Custody and claim accounting now assign every balance to an explicit liability.
Impact. A non-canonical holding path could diverge from project accounting. Registry and holding identities are now checked at the mutation boundary.
Impact. A caller could compose a fill without an on-chain price limit inside the package. The supported transaction composition now enforces the user limit before settlement.
Impact. Governance can configure a trade whose proceeds are entirely redirected as fees. This remains an explicit governance boundary and must be controlled operationally.
Impact. Redemption could combine assets from different project contexts. The affected path was removed from the release architecture rather than patched in place.
Impact. A privileged holder can issue outside the normal automated policy path. The capability is treated as a narrow governance authority that requires controlled custody.
Impact. State lifecycle and package deployment could drift together in unsafe ways. The version domains are now validated independently.
Impact. An authorized keeper can affect order lifecycle. The role is retained as an explicit operating trust assumption with auditable use.
Impact. Long-lived books can accumulate state and cleanup cost. Bounded operations and keeper maintenance reduce the exposure, but economically bounded storage is not formally guaranteed.
Impact. A structurally valid but incorrect registry object could be supplied. Exact identity binding now rejects cross-context substitution.
Impact. Indexers could interpret one value as both pre-fee and post-fee settlement. Events now emit distinct accounting values.
Impact. Equivalent fee flows could route through different recipient logic. The implementation now uses one consistent recipient source.
Impact. A one-hundred-percent redirect could leave a zero operation in the settlement path. The zero-value branch is now handled explicitly.
Impact. Policy order could silently discard an earlier mutation. The pipeline now enforces single-consumer behavior and exact configured order.
Impact. A removed policy could leave live state that continued to affect settlement. Policy generation and lifecycle checks now retire stale streams.
Impact. Legacy privileged issuance could mutate state while the canonical package was paused or out of version. The path now obeys the same gates as production issuance.
Impact. Referral rewards are additive rather than value-neutral. The inflation is an explicit economic policy and must be budgeted and monitored as such.
Impact. User exit liveness depends on keeper availability. Operational monitoring and recovery procedures remain part of the trust model.
Impact. On-chain eligibility does not prove unique human participation. Campaign budgets and off-chain anti-abuse controls remain necessary.
Impact. Equivalent stake transitions could accrue different outcomes. Checkpointing now settles the old interval before applying new tier or duration state.
Impact. A valid but unsafe administrative configuration can distort campaign cadence. This is retained as a documented configuration and governance risk.
Impact. The zero-bonus branch could produce different routing from nonzero referrals. The path now settles deterministically without creating an invalid recipient operation.
Impact. Emergency pause favors containment over some user lifecycle operations. The tradeoff is documented in the operating runbook and recovery model.
The formal report records 191 passing proof functions across LiquidLink models and direct production targets. The evidence covers exact project and policy binding, stale-generation invalidation, strict policy order, complete one-time settlement, referral accounting, staking checkpointing, orderbook custody and fee conservation, limit-price behavior, and check-in replay prevention.
Formal success does not prove honest administration, Sybil resistance, keeper availability, economic value, frontend transaction composition, or indexer completeness. Those boundaries are kept explicit rather than being converted into implementation closure.
The original deliverables and publication history are available in the public report repository.