LiquidLink closed every implementation finding across score, policy, and orderbook flows

The final assessment reconciled 24 canonical findings across score accounting, policy settlement, point tokenization, point trading, referrals, staking, and check-in. Fifteen findings were resolved or removed, nine remain documented trust or operating assumptions, and no implementation finding remains open.

Reviewers
Zzyzx Security Review
Commit
64a477bf9ae945ff585f9dd70231945a9a741ea9 plus reviewed working-tree changes
Language
Move (Sui)
In scope
  • LiquidLink core and administration packages
  • Score accounting, Stamps, and policy settlement
  • Point tokenization and the point-trading orderbook
  • Referral, Nemo Staking, and Check-in policies

Complete evidence, severity rationale, and remediation record.

01

Manual Security Audit

sha256 379f8edb221ee290973a9710803bd2fd86d02f7941c506d1b6a4a2ba5517acf6

Download PDF · 6pp

02

Formal Verification Report

sha256 227cf25d20633ad4bf455457afdd5deeaab28eb0b2b3cc251db3d0a6599f2f4c

Download PDF · 8pp

Findings

Medium16 Low7 Info1
  1. LL-01 Exact-in orderbook arithmetic could overflow Medium Fixed
  2. LL-02 Orderbook custody could retain ambiguous residual dust Medium Fixed
  3. LL-03 Token holding registry accounting could be bypassed Medium Fixed
  4. LL-04 Best-fill composition lacked an intrinsic limit-price guard Medium Fixed
  5. LL-05 Fee configuration permits a one-hundred-percent rate Medium Acknowledged
  6. LL-06 TGE redemption could bind mismatched project assets Medium Fixed
  7. LL-07 PointCap remains an unbounded privileged issuance lane Medium Acknowledged
  8. LL-08 Project state version was coupled to package version Medium Fixed
  9. LL-09 Keeper cancellation remains a governance authority Low Acknowledged
  10. LL-10 Orderbook storage and gas growth remain operationally bounded Low Acknowledged
  11. LL-11 Counterparty registry entries were not exact-bound Low Fixed
  12. LL-12 Order events mixed gross and net values Low Fixed
  13. LL-13 Fee recipient handling was inconsistent across paths Info Fixed
  14. LL-14 A full redirect could create a zero-value add operation Medium Fixed
  15. LL-15 Multiple policies could overwrite the same linear stream Medium Fixed
  16. LL-16 Unregistering a policy did not retire its linear streams Medium Fixed
  17. LL-17 A legacy PointCap path bypassed pause and version gates Medium Fixed
  18. AUX-01 Referral bonuses intentionally increase total issuance Medium Acknowledged
  19. AUX-04 Nemo unstaking depends on an authorized keeper Medium Acknowledged
  20. AUX-05 Check-in rewards retain a Sybil and budget boundary Medium Acknowledged
  21. AUX-07 Staking tier and duration transitions were asymmetric Medium Fixed
  22. AUX-08 Reset-bucket configuration can be misconfigured Low Acknowledged
  23. AUX-09 Zero referrer bonus routing was inconsistent Low Fixed
  24. AUX-11 Pause can block detach and transfer operations Low Acknowledged

LiquidLink combines score accounting, configurable policy pipelines, tokenized points, an orderbook, referrals, staking, and check-in campaigns. The assessment treated those systems as one settlement graph: an identity or lifecycle error in one package could invalidate accounting that looked correct in isolation.

The final manual assessment records 24 canonical findings: 15 resolved or removed, nine acknowledged or conditional, and zero open. The companion formal program passed 191 of 191 shared-suite proofs and mapped every LiquidLink finding to direct proofs, protocol models, Move regressions, structural evidence, or an explicit trusted boundary.

Security model

The review centered on six invariants:

  1. Project, Scoreboard, source, operation, and nonce identities must bind exactly.
  2. Policy registration, generation, state, and order must match the configured pipeline.
  3. Every required policy must execute exactly once before settlement.
  4. Tokenized scores, holding registries, treasury capabilities, and orderbooks must bind to the intended project and asset type.
  5. Orderbook custody, fees, cancellation, and claims must conserve value.
  6. Closing a campaign must stop new accrual without destroying an existing claim.

Canonical finding register

Core and orderbook

LL-01 Medium Fixed

Exact-in orderbook arithmetic could overflow

Impact. Full-width arithmetic could abort a valid exact-in fill. The implementation now uses bounded intermediates and preserves the intended rounding direction.

LL-02 Medium Fixed

Orderbook custody could retain ambiguous residual dust

Impact. Residual balances could become detached from a clear accounting owner. Custody and claim accounting now assign every balance to an explicit liability.

LL-03 Medium Fixed

Token holding registry accounting could be bypassed

Impact. A non-canonical holding path could diverge from project accounting. Registry and holding identities are now checked at the mutation boundary.

LL-04 Medium Fixed

Best-fill composition lacked an intrinsic limit-price guard

Impact. A caller could compose a fill without an on-chain price limit inside the package. The supported transaction composition now enforces the user limit before settlement.

LL-05 Medium Acknowledged

Fee configuration permits a one-hundred-percent rate

Impact. Governance can configure a trade whose proceeds are entirely redirected as fees. This remains an explicit governance boundary and must be controlled operationally.

LL-06 Medium Fixed

TGE redemption could bind mismatched project assets

Impact. Redemption could combine assets from different project contexts. The affected path was removed from the release architecture rather than patched in place.

LL-07 Medium Acknowledged

PointCap remains an unbounded privileged issuance lane

Impact. A privileged holder can issue outside the normal automated policy path. The capability is treated as a narrow governance authority that requires controlled custody.

LL-08 Medium Fixed

Project state version was coupled to package version

Impact. State lifecycle and package deployment could drift together in unsafe ways. The version domains are now validated independently.

LL-09 Low Acknowledged

Keeper cancellation remains a governance authority

Impact. An authorized keeper can affect order lifecycle. The role is retained as an explicit operating trust assumption with auditable use.

LL-10 Low Acknowledged

Orderbook storage and gas growth remain operationally bounded

Impact. Long-lived books can accumulate state and cleanup cost. Bounded operations and keeper maintenance reduce the exposure, but economically bounded storage is not formally guaranteed.

LL-11 Low Fixed

Counterparty registry entries were not exact-bound

Impact. A structurally valid but incorrect registry object could be supplied. Exact identity binding now rejects cross-context substitution.

LL-12 Low Fixed

Order events mixed gross and net values

Impact. Indexers could interpret one value as both pre-fee and post-fee settlement. Events now emit distinct accounting values.

LL-13 Info Fixed

Fee recipient handling was inconsistent across paths

Impact. Equivalent fee flows could route through different recipient logic. The implementation now uses one consistent recipient source.

Policy and lifecycle

LL-14 Medium Fixed

A full redirect could create a zero-value add operation

Impact. A one-hundred-percent redirect could leave a zero operation in the settlement path. The zero-value branch is now handled explicitly.

LL-15 Medium Fixed

Multiple policies could overwrite the same linear stream

Impact. Policy order could silently discard an earlier mutation. The pipeline now enforces single-consumer behavior and exact configured order.

LL-16 Medium Fixed

Unregistering a policy did not retire its linear streams

Impact. A removed policy could leave live state that continued to affect settlement. Policy generation and lifecycle checks now retire stale streams.

LL-17 Medium Fixed

A legacy PointCap path bypassed pause and version gates

Impact. Legacy privileged issuance could mutate state while the canonical package was paused or out of version. The path now obeys the same gates as production issuance.

AUX-01 Medium Acknowledged

Referral bonuses intentionally increase total issuance

Impact. Referral rewards are additive rather than value-neutral. The inflation is an explicit economic policy and must be budgeted and monitored as such.

AUX-04 Medium Acknowledged

Nemo unstaking depends on an authorized keeper

Impact. User exit liveness depends on keeper availability. Operational monitoring and recovery procedures remain part of the trust model.

AUX-05 Medium Acknowledged

Check-in rewards retain a Sybil and budget boundary

Impact. On-chain eligibility does not prove unique human participation. Campaign budgets and off-chain anti-abuse controls remain necessary.

AUX-07 Medium Fixed

Staking tier and duration transitions were asymmetric

Impact. Equivalent stake transitions could accrue different outcomes. Checkpointing now settles the old interval before applying new tier or duration state.

AUX-08 Low Acknowledged

Reset-bucket configuration can be misconfigured

Impact. A valid but unsafe administrative configuration can distort campaign cadence. This is retained as a documented configuration and governance risk.

AUX-09 Low Fixed

Zero referrer bonus routing was inconsistent

Impact. The zero-bonus branch could produce different routing from nonzero referrals. The path now settles deterministically without creating an invalid recipient operation.

AUX-11 Low Acknowledged

Pause can block detach and transfer operations

Impact. Emergency pause favors containment over some user lifecycle operations. The tradeoff is documented in the operating runbook and recovery model.

Formal verification evidence

The formal report records 191 passing proof functions across LiquidLink models and direct production targets. The evidence covers exact project and policy binding, stale-generation invalidation, strict policy order, complete one-time settlement, referral accounting, staking checkpointing, orderbook custody and fee conservation, limit-price behavior, and check-in replay prevention.

Formal success does not prove honest administration, Sybil resistance, keeper availability, economic value, frontend transaction composition, or indexer completeness. Those boundaries are kept explicit rather than being converted into implementation closure.

The original deliverables and publication history are available in the public report repository.